Dean Lost - Does This Mean Nothing Changed?

In this post I'm going to respond to Ryan's post Beginning at the End over at HFA. First, Ryan argues that the Dean campaign's collapse in January 2004 shows that not much had changed:

First, it may be a bit circular to make this point, but Dean's campaign couldn't have been all that much of a revolution if he didn't win. He didn't even make it out of the Democratic primaries. He didn't even get the consolation prize of the vice-presidential nod. A lasting revolution usually has something you can point to, some kind of victory... but his campaign does not seem to have that.

Dean did get a consolation prize--chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee. He won this position despite the opposition of many prominent Democrats. In contrast, liberal bloggers strongly supported Dean and attacked his opponents--for example, emphasizing Martin Frost's support for many of Bush's policies. Furthermore, through grassroots fundraising, Dean has raised more money than any other DNC Chairman in a similar period. This looks like strong evidence that Dean's campaign was more than a blip.

Ryan continues:

Second, traditional media -- TV and newspapers -- played a large role in Dean's undoing. Look at Joe Trippi's book The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, and you'll see the role that negative TV ads (those relics of an ancient world) played in destroying Dean in Iowa.

It's true that Dean's last-minute collapse in Iowa was fueled by negative television advertising. As long as Americans watch television and read newspapers, the traditional media will remain important in campaigns. But I think it's worth asking: How did Dean become a contender in Iowa at all? The explanation is that his ability to raise money and support online made him the national front-runner. Dean was getting pounded from all sides in January 2004 and his inexperienced staff did not respond effectively. (It also didn't help that Dean had been videotaped bashing the very caucus he was attempting to win.) Future campaigns, however, will be able to combine Dean's innovative Internet strategy with expertise in traditional media. Any campaign that focuses entirely on traditional media will likely be at a disadvantage.

Ryan's third point:

Sure some people might say that yearrgh actually represents how powerful the internet can be. There's certainly some truth to that, but winning the White House is such an unbelieveably difficult challenge that it takes a coordinated message and a clear plan. TV changed campaigns because it had immense reach, but the high barriers for entry made it controllable. The yearggh shows that the internet may be too uncontrollable for a major, national campaign.

Ryan raises a good point here. The chaotic online world is not the ideal medium for message discipline. But I think that future candidates will not have much of a choice except to embrace the Internet. Witness the number of major Democratic politicans who have been posting on Daily Kos over the past year. Consider the fact that Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid will be a keynote speaker at the YearlyKos convention in June 2006. These politicians have apparently decided that online outreach is important enough to outweigh the risk of being associated with the uncontrollable blogosphere.

If all we are arguing is that traditional media is still important, then Ryan is right. But I think the real argument is not whether people continue to be influenced by television and newspapers, but rather whether the Internet is an indispensable element of future national campaigns. I believe that it is--with one caveat. The Republicans, as both the party in power and the party that has traditionally relied less on the "grassroots," have greater leeway to skimp on their Internet efforts. They are not rushing to embrace the blogs as quickly as the Democrats are. Still, Dean demonstrated what a low-budget campaign can become by using the Internet, and I think we will see plenty of candidates from both parties trying to copy this formula--and succeeding.